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Abstract: 
How do we know whether a country suffers from vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI)? What should be done about it? Academic 
appreciation of these issues in general, and the nature of political behaviour in particular, both have major implications for the 
way federations are fiscally structured. While the latter clearly is a problem of political negotiations, our focus is on the former, 
i.e., conceptual clarity, which precedes meaningful negotiations. Thus, the paper aims to clarify the multiple usages of the 
symbolically loaded terms VFI and VFG (Vertical Fiscal Gap) by critically engaging the fundamental assumptions and 
premises underlying these ostensibly similar notions. It proposes an alternative conceptual framework and introduces the 
concepts of Vertical Fiscal Asymmetry (VFA) and Vertical Fiscal Difference (VFD) that have the potential to better 
structure public debate on issues of vertical fiscal relations and stimulate a sensible appreciation of the problem and possible 
remedies.    
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“The paper is both a nice synthesis and an important new way of looking at fiscal gap/imbalance issues.”  
                                                                                                                                            –Professor Robin Boadway  
Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Economic Theory  
David Chadwick Smith Chair in Economics  
at Queen's University, Canada.  
 
“This is a valuable exercise in conceptual clarification on a troubled and important public policy topic. I regard the article as highly successful 
and found its discussion of the literature most helpful. Given its ambitions, the length of the paper is justifiable.”  
 
                                                                                                                                                 --Anonymous Reviewer (Public Administration) 
 
“The paper is an impressive analysis and clarification of the important notions of fiscal imbalance and fiscal gap, and will be of interest to 
scholars and practitioners of fiscal federalism.” 
                                                                                                                                                  --Anonymous Reviewer (Public Administration) 
 
This paper is essentially a treatise. The problem is a significant one, an innovative approach is taken to addressing the problem, and the issues 
are of international concern. I think the paper makes a useful contribution in terms of framing the debate and inviting further refinements.” 
                                                                                                                                                  --Anonymous Reviewer (Public Administration) 
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INTRODUCTION 
CVNWTZF3 
 
This article examines the concept of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), which remains under debate because there 
is neither a universally accepted definition of VFI in the fiscal federalism literature (table 1) nor a commonly 
accepted approach to measuring it (see table 2). Estimates of VFI are derived, much like accounting or deficit 
measurements, by comparing the revenues and expenditures of two levels of government. VFI is, however, too 
nuanced an issue to be described by this kind of national accounting procedure. 
 
The problem we address is substantive, but also has an important terminological dimension. Terms such as VFI 
and VFG (vertical fiscal gap) are often used to structure political debate in federations, but different authors use 
them with different meanings and thus cause ambiguity in the policy solutions to the assumed problems. The 
imprecise usage of VFI (table 1) and VFG (table 3) for different ideas in different contexts not only makes it 
difficult to combine the results of papers, which might employ the same concept for different ideas or different 
concepts for the same idea; it can also cause the fiscal policy debate to deteriorate into a tug-of-war between 
federal and regional interests (for example, the Canadian example in the section that follows). Thus, this paper 
attempts to resolve the terminological ambiguity that obscures these substantive issues in policy. 
 
One of the substantive issues in the debate on vertical fiscal relations is the question of the existence or absence 
of fiscal gaps and imbalances. Another issue is the rhetorical emphasis on either of two remedies, that is, federal 
transfers and subnational tax autonomy. This paper presents a conceptual framework that goes beyond the 
‘rhetoric’ on either side of intergovernmental debates about vertical fiscal relations and promotes a more 
nuanced understanding of the problems of fiscal gaps and imbalances and their potential solutions. 
 
In the section that follows, we begin by defining the problem and subsequently place it in an international 
context. To establish the need to re-evaluate VFI, we then critically examine the conventional approach to VFI 
and show why it is not useful for evaluating fiscal policies in the public sector. This is followed by a review of 
scholarly attempts to ‘refine’ the conventional definition of VFI by placing it in a dynamic framework. The 
penultimate section proposes an alternative conceptual framework to evaluate VFI and VFG more precisely. 
This section introduces a new concept of vertical fiscal difference (VFD) that is rooted in a coherent and logically 
sustainable conceptual framework. The final section applies the proposed conceptual framework to the problem 
of VFI and its resolution.  
 
 
BEYOND GAPS AND IMBALANCES: A CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE ON VERTICAL FISCAL 
DIFFERENCE (VFD) 
 
In this section, we propose an alternative conceptual framework to evaluate vertical fiscal relations. This 
alternative framework clearly distinguishes between VFI and VFG and defines them in terms of their respective 
conceptual premises. Thus, it harnesses the ability of these concepts to evaluate and guide fiscal policies in the 
public sector. Whilst we recognize that the conceptual perspectives behind VFI and VFG raise important points 
for consideration, the proposed conceptual framework offers an impartial solution that avoids taking a side with 
either perspective. 
 
Integrating VFI and VFG in a unified framework 
 
As discussed above, there are two contrasting ways to evaluate and guide fiscal policy in multi-tiered systems. 
The drawback of the VFG perspective is that it views even a large vertical fiscal asymmetry (VFA) − termed VFG 
− as optimal. This approach can rationalize the intrusive actions by the federal government that lead to coercive 
fiscal relations characterized by federal pre-emption of state and local authority (see Kincaid 1990). However, 
the VFI perspective is equally flawed in that it goes to the other extreme and argues that transfers are weak 
policy instruments that sever the connection between spending and taxing authority. 
 
In fact, the revenue-expenditure asymmetry between the two levels of a government does not always clearly 
indicate the extent to which the revenue-raising powers should be matched to spending responsibilities and the 
extent to which a restructuring of intergovernmental transfers is required. Thus, instead of claiming that this 
state is either VFI or VFG, we should call it VFA. 
 
It should be noted that VFA has two components: VFI – the undesirable part (to be addressed by reallocation of 
fiscal instruments), and VFG – the desirable part (to be addressed by transfers). The concept of VFG, as 
originally conceived, states that the federal transfers must bridge the vertical fiscal gap, implying that, unless 
addressed, a fiscal gap will remain. When transfers are adequate, there is no gap.1 Thus, a state can be reached 
where there is no imbalance and no gap. We propose the term ‘vertical fiscal difference’ (VFD) for this state. 
The literature lacks a systematic way to refer to this state. 
 
From the above it is clear that VFI and VFG both represent the situations that need correction, albeit by 
applying different fiscal instruments. Interestingly, when Seguin Commission (2002) argued for a radical 
rebalancing of the federation to virtually close all but a small amount of the fiscal gap, they clearly understood 
the two distinct problems of fiscal arrangements in a federation (that is, inappropriate allocation and 
inadequate transfers) and even attempted to empirically estimate their value. On one hand, the Commission 
argued that the federal government had undesirably large revenue-raising powers, often used for federal-
provincial transfers, beyond the legitimate need to fulfil equalization commitments. It argued that the transfers 
should not be used as conditional grants in areas of provincial jurisdiction. Thus, it recommended that the social 
component of existing transfers should be replaced with a substantial reallocation of revenue-raising authority 
from the federal government to the provinces. 
 
At the same time, the Commission also held unilateral reduction in federal transfers as a factor responsible for 
shifting the federal deficit problem to the provinces during the deficit reduction years of the Paul Martin 
Finance Ministry. The Commission observed that federal reductions in federal cash grants were much larger in 
percentage terms as compared to the reductions in conditional grants for federal spending programmes in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction. 
 
Thus, VFI and VFG in the perspective proposed in this study may be understood as illustrated in table 
5 and figure 1. VFI is a result of inappropriate assignments. Thus, it is a structural problem. If there is excessive 
revenue centralization then a positive VFI will emerge. If there is excessive revenue decentralization then a 
negative VFI will emerge. In extreme cases of negative VFI, the SNGs finance national government 
expenditures. For example, under the first American Constitution (1781–89) the general government was 
entirely dependent on contributions from the states as it did not have any power to raise revenues. This negative 
fiscal imbalance was rectified in the new ‘federal’ Constitution of 1789, which granted the central government 
significant power over fiscal resources (Studenski and Krooss 1963). Similarly, the fiscal arrangements 
implemented by the Government of India Act 1919 resulted in a huge surplus for the provinces. The centre, in 
turn, was financed with the contributions from the provinces. This negative fiscal imbalance was corrected by 
the Government of India Act of 1935, which granted more revenue powers to the centre with a concomitant 
system of devolution. This is summarized as: 
 
VFI = Actual Vertical Fiscal Asymmetry – Desired or Optimal Vertical Fiscal Asymmetry 
VFI = +ve when Actual Asymmetry > Desired Asymmetry 
VFI = −ve when Actual Asymmetry < Desired Asymmetry 
VFI = 0 when actual asymmetry is optimal. 
 
The proposed conceptual framework is based on the understanding that some revenue-expenditure asymmetry 
is inevitable and desirable. In this perspective, the absence of asymmetry should not be defined as 
the standard, relative to which the state of VFI exists, because restoring balance by eliminating asymmetry is 
not a realistic possibility. We say this for the reasons detailed in the section, ‘What is VFD? Why it is Needed’. 
                                                 
1
 The originators of the term ‘fiscal gap’ (Boadway and Flatters 1982, p. 6) clearly stated that from an economic 
perspective the ideal form of government – that is, the one that is most conducive to efficiency and equity – is the single-
tier system of government. In their view, in amulti-tier system, a ‘fiscal gap’ is desired to enable the central government ‘to 
replicate the efficiency and equity outcomes of a unitary state, through the application of intergovernmental transfers’ (p. 
6). Thus, transfers, in this view, are determined not by the asymmetry between revenue and expenditure, but by the federal 
government’s need to achieve a second-best unitary outcome in a decentralized setting. The term VFG is used, in this 
perspective, to avoid using the word imbalance; in other words, VFA should not be called VFI because is a desirable state 
of affairs (see, for example, Winer and Maslove 1996, p. 52; Breton 1998, pp. 197–8). It should instead be called VFG, 
which implies that there is not an imbalance to be resolved with reassignments, but only a gap to be filled by transfers 
(Boadway 2004a, p. 2; Dahlby 2005, p. 3; Lee 2006, p. 14). 
 
Despite the original intention to replace VFI with VFG, an attempt has recently been redefine VFI in a sharp contrast to its 
conventional meaning. For instance, Boadway and Tremblay (2006), re-define VFI as a situation where the federal 
government does not provide the proper level of grants to bridge the vertical gap between revenue sources and expenditure 
responsibilities at the provincial and federal levels, which arises due to the greater revenue-raising ability of the federal 
government. Using the term VFI for this state is not only inconsistent with the very concept of VFI and its usage, but also 
goes against the original definition of the VFG concept. It would be more appropriate to say that there is no VFG (i.e. VFG 
is addressed) when the gap is bridged, and that VFG remains (unaddressed) otherwise 
 
The standard of reference for estimating VFI is ‘optimal asymmetry’. The issue of determining optimality is 
discussed in the final section. 
 
VFG implies that there is no problem with assignments as such. The only remaining issue is of closing the gap. If 
the federal government focuses too much on federal transfers, the gap will be over-filled and a negative VFG will 
emerge. It will create the soft budget constraint problem (SBC). With a SBC, subnational governments have 
perverse incentives to indulge in inefficient project spending (see Wildasin 1997). However, if − at the extreme 
end of the spectrum − the emphasis is placed on eliminating federal transfers, VFG will not be bridged. Thus, a 
positive VFG will emerge. It will create an inefficiently inflexible hard budget constraint (HBC) that can 
discourage investments that are socially efficient (see Besfamille and Lockwood 2008). This is summarized as: 
 
VFG = Desirable Asymmetry – Federal Transfers 
VFG = +ve when Federal Transfers < Desirable Asymmetry 
VFG = −ve when Federal Transfers > Desirable Asymmetry 
VFG = 0 when Federal Transfers = Desirable Asymmetry 
(that is, when transfers are optimal) 
 
The above discussion leads to a clear choice of remedies. To the extent that the actual revenue-expenditure 
asymmetry deviates from the optimal, that is, when there is VFI, the system will require rebalancing by 
reassignments (for example, by devolving more revenue-raising powers to SNGs). To the extent that there is 
VFG, the ‘gap’ should be ‘filled’ by using the transfer scheme (see figure 1, above). Thus, both policy instruments 
have separate and complementary functions. Although both can supplement subnational funds, neither can 
compensate for the lack of the other. Thus, neither is superior to the other. This perspective eliminates the 
possibility of favouring one policy over the other for rhetorical reasons. 
 
Federal transfers refer to: 
•Formula based grants, basically lump sum (unconditional) but also conditional for specific programmes of 
national significance; 
•Need-capacity based revenue-sharing (under special circumstances). This system works like block grants with 
the limitation that it cannot be targeted to specific SNGs; 
•We exclude loans because they are not transfers in the strict sense of the term. Loans only become transfers 
when they have interest subsidies or are written off. 
 
Subnational own-source revenues refer to: 
•Tax and non-tax revenue from own sources. These include (a) tax revenue from the tax bases either exclusively 
assigned to SNGs or jointly occupied with the national government; and (b) non tax revenues from user charges; 
•Origin-based revenue sharing (under special circumstances). This system works as a substitute for devolution 
of tax powers when subnational capacity to administer taxes is severely lacking; 
•We exclude subnational borrowing because it is not an alternative to taxation and tax revenues must 
subsequently repay it. 
 
Our approach does not overemphasize the case for own-source revenues and it does not allow transfers to cause 
dependency because they are used to fill optimal VFA, rather than actual VFA. The latter approach (filling actual 
VFA at subnational level) has been used in the past with unwelcome results in China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
South Africa, and Sri Lanka (Shah 2007, p. 19). In our approach, transfers do not lead to accountability 
problems because SNGs control their own revenues at the margin, for example, by choosing tax rates (Bird 
2000). 
 
This method not only prevents the use of transfers to accommodate ‘extra’ spending but also restricts SNGs 
from borrowing to finance current expenditures. Together, these conditions require SNGs to raise taxes to 
finance their marginal expenditures (that is, above what is covered by the federal transfer), and leaves them 
accountable to voters for their tax and spending decisions. These restrictions preserve accountability without 
recourse to strict separation of tax-raising powers. 
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FIGURE 1  A schematic view of the alternative conceptual perspective 
 
  
TABLE 5 Towards Resolution of Terminological Confusion 
State of fiscal 
arrangement 
Terms in vogue Terminology proposed 
 
A given revenue-
expenditure asymmetry 
VFI(Vertical Fiscal 
Imbalance), VFG 
(Vertical Fiscal 
Gap) 
 
 
VFA (Vertical Fiscal Asymmetry) 
 
VFI 
 
 
Remedial Measure 
Positive VFI 
 
Negative VFI 
 
Inappropriate 
allocation of revenue 
powers and spending 
responsibilities 
 
VFI, VFG   
 
 
 
 
 
Extreme 
centralization of 
revenue powers 
Extreme decentralization 
of revenue powers 
Reassignment of 
revenue raising 
powers 
 
 
VFG 
 
Remedial Measure 
Positive VFG 
 
Negative VFG 
 
Desirable revenue-
expenditure asymmetry  
with a fiscal gap to be 
closed 
 
Optimal VFG,  
VFG, VFI 
Inadequate federal 
transfers relative to 
the desired 
asymmetry 
Excess federal transfers 
relative to the desired 
asymmetry 
 
Recalibration of 
federal transfers 
 
 
Desirable revenue-
expenditure asymmetry  
without a fiscal gap ( 
i.e. gap is closed)   
 
----------- 
 
Vertical Fiscal Difference (VFD)* 
* In this paper we use the term VFD to refer to the optimal or desirable VFA because the term VFG is symbolically 
'loaded' and implies that there is a ‘fiscal gap’ to be closed.  
REFERENCES  
Ahmad E. 1997. Financing Decentralized Expenditures—An International Comparison of Grants. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishers. 
Ahmad E. and J. Craig. 1997. ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers’, in T. Ter-Minassian (ed.), Fiscal 
Federalism in Theory and Practice. Washington, DC: IMF, pp.74-76. 
Baldwin, R. and P. Krugman. 2000. ‘Agglomeration, Integration, and Tax Harmonization’, CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 2630, November. 
Besfamille, M. and Lockwood, B. 2008. ‘Bailouts In Federations: Is a Hard Budget Constraint Always Best ?’, 
International Economic Review, 49, 2, 577-593. 
Birch, A. H. 1955. Federalism, Finance, and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia, and the United States. 
Oxford: Clarendon University Press. 
Bird, R. M.  1976. Charging for Public Services: A New Look at an Old Idea. Toronto: Canadian Tax 
Foundation. 
Bird, R. M. 2000. ‘Rethinking Subnational Taxes: A New Look at Tax Assignment’, Tax Notes International, 
20, 19, 2069-96. 
Bird, R. M. 2003. ‘Fiscal Flows, Fiscal Balance, and Fiscal Sustainability’, Working Paper 03-02, Atlanta: 
Georgia State University. 
Bird, R. M. and A. V. Tarasov. 2004. ‘Closing the Gap: Fiscal Imbalances and Intergovernmental Transfers in 
Developed Federations’, Environment and Policy C: Government and Policy, 22, 1, 77-102. 
Boadway, R. 1998. ‘The Economics of Equalization: An Overview’, in R. Boadway and P. Hobson (eds), 
Equalization: Its Contribution to Canada’s Economic and Fiscal Progress. Kingston: John Deutsch 
Institute, pp. 27-82. 
Boadway, R. 2000. ‘Recent Developments in the Economics of Federalism’, in Harvey Lazar (ed.), Canada: 
The State of the Federation 1999-2000: Toward a New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal 
Federalism.  Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 41-78. 
Boadway, R. 2004 a. ‘Should the Canadian Federation be rebalanced?’, Queen’s University Working Paper 
(04/1) Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.  
Boadway, R. 2004 b. ‘The Theory and Practice of Equalization’, CESifo Economic Studies, 50, 1, 211-54. 
Boadway, R. 2005. ‘The Vertical Fiscal Gap: Conceptions and Misconceptions’, in Harvey Lazar (ed.), 
Canadian Fiscal Arrangements: What Works, What Might Work Better. Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s Press, pp. 51–80.  
Boadway, R.  2007.  ‘Grants in a Federal Economy: A Conceptual Perspective’, in R. Boadway and A. Shah 
(eds),  Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 55-74. 
Boadway, R. and F. Flatters. 1982. Equalization in a Federal State: An Economic Analysis. Ottawa: Economic 
Council of Canada. 
Boadway, R. and P. Hobson. 1993. Intergovernmental Finance in Canada. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation. 
Boadway, R. and A. Shah (eds).  2007.  Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers. Washington DC: World Bank.  
Boadway, R. and J. Tremblay. 2006. ‘A Theory of Fiscal Imbalance’, FinanzArchiv, 62, 1, 1–27. 
Brake, G. 1967. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution. 
Brennan, G. and J. Buchanan. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. 
Cambridge: CUP.  
Breton, A. 1998. Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Buchanan, J. M. 1950. ‘Federalism and Fiscal Equity,’ American Economic Review, 40, 4, 583-599.  
Buchanan, J. M., and R. A. Musgrave. 1999. Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of 
the State. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Bucovetsky, S. and M. Smart.  2006. ‘The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax 
Competition and Tax Distortions’, Journal of Public Economic Theory 8, 1, 119-144. 
Burns, R. M. 1980. The Acceptable Mean: The Tax Rental Agreements, 1941-62. Toronto: Canadian Tax 
Foundation. 
Cai, H.  and D. Triesman. 2004. ‘State Corroding Federalism’, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 3-4, 819-43. 
Chelliah, R. J. 2010. Political Economy of Poverty Reduction in India. New Delhi: Sage. 
Collins, D. J. 2002. ‘The 2000 Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Australia’, in International 
Symposium on Fiscal Imbalance: A Report. Canada: Commission on Fiscal Imbalance, pp 113-44. 
Courchene, T. J. 2006. ‘Variations on the Federalism Theme’, Policy Options, 27, 7, 46-54. 
 
Dahlby, B. 2005. Dealing with the Fiscal Imbalances: Vertical, Horizontal and Structural. Toronto: C.D. Howe 
Institute.  
Dahlby, B. 2009. ‘The Optimal Taxation Approach to Intergovernmental Grants’, Working Paper No. 2009-16, 
University of Alberta, Department of Economics. 
Dahlby, B. and L.S. Wilson. 1994. ‘Fiscal Capacity, Tax Effort, and Optimal Equalization Grants’, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 27, 3, 657-72. 
Dahlby, B., J. Rodden, and S. Wilson. 2009. ‘A Median Voter Model of the Vertical Fiscal Gap’, Working 
Paper No. 2009-14, University of Alberta, Department of Economics. 
Diaz-Cayeros, A. 2006. Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dillinger, W., and S. Webb. 2001. Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies: Argentina and Brazil. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Duff, D. G. 2004. ‘Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice’, University of Toronto Law Journal, 
54, 4, 391-447. 
Ebel, R. D. and S. Yilmaz. 2002. ‘Concept of Fiscal Decentralization and Worldwide Overview’, in 
International Symposium on Fiscal Imbalance: A Report. Canada: Commission on Fiscal Imbalance, 
pp.145-74. 
Fisher, R. C. 1982. ‘Income and Grant Effects on Local Expenditure: The Flypaper Effect and Other 
Difficulties’, Journal of Urban Economics, 12, 3, 324-45. 
Gibson, E.  and E. Calvo. 2000. ‘Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial Dimensions of 
Economic Reform in Argentina’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 35, 3, 32-55. 
Gramlich, E. M. 1977. ‘Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature’, Wallace E. Oates 
(ed.), The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, pp. 219-
39. 
Grewal, B. 1995. ‘Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Australia: A Problem for Tax Structure, not for Revenue 
Sharing’, Working Paper. Melbourne, Australia: Victoria University. 
Gruber, J., and E. Saez. 2002. ‘The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications’, Journal of Public 
Economics 84, 1, 1–32. 
Hadiz, V. R. 2004. ‘Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist 
Perspectives’, Development and Change, 35, 6, 697–718. 
Hallwood, P. and R. MacDonald. 2005. ‘The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism’, in  B. Ashcroft, D. Coyle 
and W. Alexander (eds), New Wealth for Old Nations. Princeton (NJ) USA: Princeton University Press, 
pp. 96-116. 
Hartle, D. G. 1971. ‘The impact of new tax policies on national unity’, in Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, In Search of Balance— Canada’s Intergovernmental experience. 
Washington DC. 
Hettich, W. and S. Winer. 1986. ‘Vertical Imbalance in the Fiscal Systems of Federal States’, Canadian Journal 
of Economics, 19, 4, 745-65. 
Hunter, J.S.H. 1974. ‘Vertical Intergovernmental Financial Imbalance: A Framework for Evaluation’, 
Finanzarchiv, 2, 481-92. 
Hunter, J.S.H. 1977. Federalism and Fiscal Balance. Canberra:  ANU Press.   
James, D. 1997. ‘Commonwealth Assistance to the States Since 1976’, Background Paper No. 5, 1997-98, 20 
October. Australia: Department of the Parliamentary Library. 
Janeba, E. and G. Schjelerup. 2002. ‘Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - And the U.S. Even More 
So’, NBER Working Paper No. 9334, November. 
Joumard, I. and M. Kongsrud. 2003. ‘Fiscal Relations across Government Levels’, OECD Economic Studies, 
36, 1, 155-228. 
Keen, M. 1998. ‘Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, IMF Staff Papers, 45, 3, 454-
85. 
Khemani, S. 2006. ‘Can Delegation Promote Fiscal Discipline in a Federation? Evidence from Fiscal 
Performance in the Indian States’, Conference Background Paper. Columbia University: Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue. 
Kincaid, J. 1990 . ‘From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 509, 1, 139 – 52. 
King, D. 1984. Fiscal Tiers: The Economics of Multilevel Government.  London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Köthenbürger, M. 2005. ‘Leviathans, Federal transfers, and the Cartelization Hypothesis’, Public Choice, 122, 
3, 449-65. 
Krogstrup, S. 2002. ‘What do Theories of Tax Competition Predict for Capital Taxes in EU Countries? A 
Review of the Tax Competition Literature’, HEI Working Paper No. 05/2002, May.  
Lazar, H., F. St-Hilaire and J.F.Tremblay. 2004. ‘Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Myth or Reality’, in H. Lazar and 
F. St-Hilaire (eds), Money, Politics and Health Care: Reconstructing the Federal-Provincial 
Partnership. Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queens University Press, pp. 135-87. 
Lee, M. 2006. ‘Tax Cuts and the Fiscal Imbalance.’ Vancouver: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives BC 
Office. 
Lewis B. 2002. ‘Indonesia’, in P. Smoke and Y. Kim (eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Asia: 
Current Practice and Challenges for the Future. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 138-44. 
Lockwood, B. 1999. ‘Inter-Regional Insurance’, Journal of Public Economics, 72, 1, 1–37. 
Lockwood, B. 2001. ‘Tax Competition and Tax Co-ordination under Destination and Origin Principles: A 
Synthesis’, Journal of Public Economics,  81, 2,  279–319. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. 2008. ‘Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal Decentralization’, in N. Bosch and 
J. M. Duran (eds), Fiscal Federalism and Political Decentralization: Lessons from Spain, Germany, 
and Canada. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 27-55. 
Mathews, R. 1980. Regional Disparities and Fiscal Equalisation in Australia. Canberra: ANU Press. 
Matier, C., L. Wu and H. Jackson. 2001. ‘Analysing Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in a Framework of Fiscal 
Sustainability’, Working Paper (01/23). Ottawa: Department of Finance. 
McLean, I. 2004. ‘Fiscal Federalism in Australia’, Public Administration: An International Quarterly, 82, 1, 21-
38. 
McLure, C. E. 1967. ‘The Interstate Exporting of State and Local Taxes: Estimates for 1962’,  National Tax 
Journal, 20, 2, 49-77. 
McLure, C. E. 1994. ‘The Tax Assignment Problem: Ends, Means, and Constraints’, Australian Tax Forum, 11, 
2, 153-83. 
McLure, C. E. 1998. ‘The Revenue Assignment Problem: Ends, Means, and Constraints’, Journal of Public 
Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 9, 4, 652-83. 
McLure, C. E. 2001. ‘The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How Theory and Practice Depend on 
History’, National Tax Journal , 54, 2, 339-64. 
Mintz, J., and M. Smart. 2004. ‘Income Shifting, Investment, and Tax Competition: Theory and Evidence from 
Provincial Taxation’,  Journal of Public Economics 88, 6, 1149–68. 
Mitin, D. 2009. ‘The Clash of Perspectives? The EU and Russian Views on Federalism’, Cross-cultural 
Communication, 5, 4, 1-9.  
Mitra, S. 1999. ‘Speedbrakers Ahead’, India Today 24 (February): p. 45. 
Montero, A. 2001. ‘Decentralizing democracy: Spain and Brazil in comparative perspective’, Comparative 
Politics, 33, 2, 149-169. 
Muddipi, S. 1991. Finance Commissions and Center State Financial Relations. Allahabad: Chugh Publications.  
Musgrave, R. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Myers, G. 1990. ‘Optimality, Free Mobility and the Regional Authority in a Federation’, Journal of Public 
Economics, 43, 1, 127-41. 
Nice, D.C. 1987. Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations. New York: St Martin’s Press. 
Oates, W. E.  1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
Oates, W. E . 1993. ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development’, National Tax Journal, 46, 2, 237-43. 
Osterkamp, R. and M. Eller. 2003. ‘How Decentralized is Government Activity?’, CESifo DICE Report- 
Journal for Institutional Comparisons, 1,1, 32-35. 
Persson, J. and G. Tabellini. 1996. ‘Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk-sharing and Redistribution’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 104, 5, 979-1009. 
Pisauro, G. 2001. ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline: Between Commons and Soft budget 
Constraint’, IMF Working Paper No. 1/65. Washington: IMF. 
Prud’homme, R. 1995. ‘On the Dangers of Decentralization’, World Bank Research Observer, 10, 2, 201-20. 
Rao, M. G. and N. Singh. 2002. ‘The Political Economy of Center-State Fiscal Transfers in India’, in John 
McLaren (ed.), Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform. Washington DC:  World Bank, pp. 
69-123.  
Riker, W. 1975. ‘Federalism’, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science (Volume 5). 
Reading (Ma.): Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
Rodden, J. and E. Wibbels. 2002. ‘Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic  Management in Multi-
tiered Systems’, World Politics, 54, 4, 494-531. 
Rodden, J., G. Eskeland, and J. Litvack. 2003. Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget 
Constraints. Cambridge Massachusetts :The MIT Press. 
Ruggeri, G. C. and R. Howard. 2001. ‘On the Concept and Measurement of Vertical Fiscal Imbalances’, SIPP 
Public Policy Paper No. 6. Canada: University of Regina. 
Ruggeri, G. C., D. Van Wart, G. K. Robertson, and R. Howard. 1993. ‘Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and 
Reallocation of Tax Fields in Canada’, Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques, 19, 2, 194-215. 
Scharpf, F. W. 1995. ‘Federal Arrangements and Multi-Party Systems’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 
30, 1, 27-39. 
Schmidt, V. 2006. ‘Adapting to Europe: Is It harder for Britain?’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 8, 1, 15-33. 
Schroeder, L. and P. Smoke. 2002. ‘Intergovernmental Transfers in Developing Countries: Concepts, 
International Practices and Policy Issues’, in P. Smoke and Y.H. Kim (eds), Intergovernmental 
Transfers in Asia: Current Practice and Challenges for the Future. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 
pp. 20-59. 
Seguin Commission (Commission on Fiscal Imbalance). 2002. A New Division of Canada’s Financial 
Resources. Québec: Government of Québec.  
Seligman, E. R. A. 1931.  Essays in Taxation.  New York: Augustus M. Kelly.  
Shah, A. 2006. ‘Lessons from International Practices of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers,’ Paper presented 
at the International Conference on Fiscal Decentralization, Islamabad, Pakistan, May 3-4.   
Shah, A. 2007. ‘A Practitioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers’, in Robin Boadway and Anwar 
Shah (eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 1-51. 
Sharma, C. K. 2009. ‘Emerging Dimensions of Decentralization Debate in the Age of Globalization’, Indian 
Journal of Federal Studies, 19, 1, 47-65.  
Sharma, C.K. 2011. ‘Multilevel Fiscal Governance in a Balanced Policy Environment', The India Economy 
Review, 8, 1, 90–7. 
Simons, H. C. 1938.  Personal Income Taxation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
Simeon, R. 1998. ‘Considerations on the Design of Federations: the South African Constitution in Comparative 
Perspective’, Working Paper (2), Canada: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University. 
Singh, R. and A. Plekhanov. 2006. ‘How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some 
Cross-Country Empirical Evidence’, IMF Staff Papers, 53, 3, 426-53. 
Smart, M.  2005. ‘Federal Transfers: Principles, Practice and Prospects’, Working paper, Canada: C. D. Howe 
Institute. 
Taliercio, R. 2005. ‘Subnational Own-Source Revenue: Getting Policy and Administration Right’ in World 
Bank (ed.), East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Governments Work. Washington DC: World Bank. 
pp. 107-28. 
Tanzi, V. 1996. ‘Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization : A Review of Some Efficiency and Macro Economic 
Issues’, in Proceedings of the World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995. Washington 
DC: World Bank, pp. 215-316. 
 The Federal Department of Finance. 2002. The Fiscal Balance in Canada: The Facts. Ottawa: Department of 
Finance, Canada. 
Tiebout, C. 1956.  ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 64, 5, 416-24. 
Treisman, D. 1999. After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. 1986. ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, in J. Elster 
(ed.), Rational Choice. New York: New York University Press, pp. 123-41.  
Uhr, J. 1989. ‘The Canadian and Australian Senates: Comparing Federal Political Institutions’, in B. W. 
Hodgins, D. Wright and W. H. Heick. (eds), Federalism in Canada and Australia: The Early Years. 
Canberra: ANU Press, pp. 130-146. 
von Hagen, J. 2007. ‘Achieving Economic Stabilization by Sharing Risk within Countries’, in R. Boadway and 
A. Shah (eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice. Washington, DC: World 
Bank, pp. 107–29. 
Wagner, R. E. 1973. The Public Economy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company. 
Wagner, R. E. 1991. ‘Tax Norms, Fiscal Reality, and the Democratic State’, in R. E. Wagner (ed.), Charging 
for Government Services: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice. New York: 
Routledge.  
Walsh, C. 1990. ‘State Taxation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance - The Radical Reform Options’, in C. Walsh 
(ed.), Issues in State Taxation. Canberra: ANU Press, pp. 53-92. 
Walter, D. M. 2004. ‘The Nation’s Growing Fiscal Imbalance’, Presentation to CSIS Global Aging Forum (June 
16). US Government Accountability Office. 
Wanna J. and P. Weller. 2003. ‘Traditions of Australian governance’, Public Administration: An International 
Quarterly, 81, 1, 63-94. 
Warren, N. 2006.  ‘Benchmarking Australia’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements: Final Report’, available 
at www.treasury.nsw.gov.au. 
Webb, R. 2002. ‘Public Finance and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance’, Research Note No. 13. Australia: Department 
of the Parliamentary Library. 
Weingast, B. R. 2006.  ‘Second-Generation Fiscal Federalism: Implications for Decentralized Democratic 
Governance and Economic Development’, Hoover Institution Working Paper, June. 
Weingast, B. R., K. A. Shepsle, and C. Johnsen. 1981. ‘The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs; A 
Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics’, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 4, 642-64.  
Wellich, D. 2000. The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Wheare, K. C. 1963. Federal Government (4th ed.) London: Oxford University Press. 
Wildasin, D. 1997. Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, L. S. 1996. ‘Federal-State fiscal Arrangements in Malaysia’, International and Development Studies 
Working Papers, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 
Kingston. 
Winer, S.  L. and A. M. Maslove. 1996. ‘Fiscal Federalism in Australia and Canada: A Brief Comparison of 
Constitutional Frameworks, Structural Features of Existing Fiscal Systems and Fiscal Institutions’, in P. 
Boothe (ed.), Reforming Fiscal Federalism for Global Competition: A Canada-Australia Comparison. 
Canada: University of Alberta Press, pp. 45-86. 
 
 
